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Production in "Paying Quantities"-A Fresh Look
Patrick S. Ottinger*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Preface
It is the purpose of this paper to review in some detail the
requirement under Louisiana law that, in connection with the
maintenance of mineral leases by production under the usual
habendum clause, such production must be in "paying quantities."'
Although this doctrine has not been presented at this institute for
about forty years, it has been examined in several fine papers to
which the reader is referred.2 While this paper attempts to capture all
significant Louisiana decisions on this topic, reference will also be
made to certain decisions in other oil producing states, particularly
Oklahoma and Texas. As noted in the Comment to Article 124 of the
Mineral Code,3 Louisiana's current law on this subject is fashioned
in large part on the pronouncements of the Texas Supreme Court in
Clifton v. Koontz.4
The notion that production must be of a certain quantity in order
to maintain a mineral lease is as old as the industry itself. The earliest
mineral lease in Louisiana jurisprudence contains an explicit
requirement that production must be in "working quantity."5
Copyright 2005, by LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. Except to the extent mentioned in Section V.I., this presentation does not
consider the import of the term "paying quantities" in other contexts, such as the
implied covenants. There the test seemingly requires that the well would be
required to pay out drilling costs, in addition to "lifting costs." See infra Section
V.I.Except to the extent mentioned in Section V.I., this presentation does not
consider the import of the term "paying quantities" in other contexts, such as the
implied covenants. There the test seemingly requires that the well would be
required to pay out drilling costs, in addition to "lifting costs." See infra Section
V.I.
2. See Edwin M. Cage, Production in Paying Quantities: Technical Problems
Involved, 10 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 61 (1959); Lonard K. Wells,
Production in Paying Quantities-A New Look at an Old Subject, 13 Inst. on Min.
L. 88 (1966); Thomas P. Battle, Lease Maintenance in the Face of
Curtailed/Depressed Markets, 32 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 14-1, at § 14 (1986);
Rick Strange, Production in Paying Quantities, The Landman, May/June 1999, at
51.
3. La. Min. Code art. 124, cmt., La. R.S. 31:124, cmt. (2004).
4. 325 S.W.2d 684, 10 Oil & Gas Rep. 1109 (1959).
5. Escoubas v. Louisiana Petroleum & Coal Oil Co., 22 La. Ann. 280, 281
(1870). The mineral lease in Escoubas was granted on October 5, 1865, six months
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Although the requirement that production must be in "paying
quantities" had been developed jurisprudentially, it is now codified
in the Louisiana Mineral Code.6 As will be discussed,7 the Louisiana
Mineral Code made significant changes to the scope of the inquiry as
had been developed by the courts. Bringing Louisiana's test in line
with otherjurisdictions, the issue of production in "paying quantities"
essentially concerns itself with the operator's motives in continuing
production at the level being obtained.
B. Definition of Production in "Paying Quantities"
Before beginning the analysis, one should start with a few
definitions. A "habendum" clause is that provision which dictates the
duration of the mineral lease. The lease subsists during the "primary
term",8 and "for so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced." The
period of time after the "primary term" is sometimes called the
"secondary term."9
It is initially observed that, even where the habendum clause does
not utilize the phrase "in paying quantities," the courts of Louisiana
will nevertheless imply such a requirement. 0 In an early case, the
habendum clause did not state that production had to be in "paying
quantities," on the basis of which omission the lessee "argued ... that
the quantity of oil produced has nothing to do with the continued life
of the lease; that just so long as any oil at all is produced from the
after the conclusion of the Civil War. Id.
6. La. Min. Code, La. R.S. 31:1-31:215 (2004).
7. See infra Part IV.
8. The Louisiana Mineral Code requires a term for all mineral leases:
The interest of a mineral lessee is not subject to the prescription ofnonuse,
but the lease must have a term. Except as provided in this Article, a lease
shall not be continued for a period of more than ten years without drilling
or mining operations or production. Except as provided in this Article, if
a mineral lease permits continuance for a period greater than ten years
without drilling or mining operations or production, the period is reduced
to ten years.
La. Min. Code art. 115(A), La. R.S. 31:115(A) (2004).
9. Williams & Meyers defines the "secondary term" as the "period subsequent
to the expiration of the primary term during which the lease ... is continued in force
by operation of the THEREAFTER CLAUSE of the lease ... ." Howard R.
Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 800 (6th ed. 1984).
10. Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate, 195 La. 865, 895, 197 So. 583, 593
(1940) (interpreting the customary habendum clause providing that the lease is to
last "for a period of five years and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them,
is produced" to mean "producing oil and gas in paying quantities").
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well the lease cannot be declared forfeited."'" The court rejected this
contention, stating that it was "not prepared to give [their] approval
to such a proposition.' 2 The court said:
A development that falls short of a reasonable production
which would bring a net profit to the lessee and furnish an
adequate consideration to the lessor for the continuance of the
lease might well be said to be no development at all within
the contemplation of the parties.
To hold that any production, however small, and in less
than paying quantities, gives to the lessee the right to continue
the lease indefinitely and with no obligation to further
development, would be contrary to the established rule of
jurisprudence, and would be writing for the parties a contract
which they never intended to make.
It was never contemplated that the lease under
consideration should be continued for all time to come upon
the mere production of oil in quantities not sufficient to
compensate the lessee and totally inadequate as a
consideration to the lessor for continuing the lease.13
The supreme court's succinct treatment in Caldwell of the lessee's
argument suggests that this requirement is a judicial articulation of
the policy of this State which seeks to prohibit the lessee from
speculating with mineral interests, or otherwise acting in a selfish
manner, without regard to the interest of the lessor. This guard
against speculation was explicitly stated as a reason for the rule by the
Texas Supreme Court in Garcia v. King. 4 There, the court observed
that the "lessors should not be required to suffer a continuation of the
lease after the expiration of the primar7 period merely for speculation
purposes on the part of the lessees. '
In Knight v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., the term "in paying
quantities" was succinctly defined, as follows:
The words 'in paying quantities' can mean the production of
oil or gas in such a quantity as will pay a small profit over
operation costs of the well, although the expense of drilling
and equipping the well may never be paid, and thus, the
11. Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 142, 108 So. 314, 315 (1926).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 142-43, 108 So. at 315.
14. 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
15. Id. at 513.
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operation as a whole might result in a loss to the lessee.
Under such circumstances, the well might be operated by the
lessee, in order to recoup some of the drilling and equipment
costs.
16
The Louisiana Supreme Court has articulated a strict reading of
the habendum clause, saying that mere "[d]iscovery of a well capable
of producing minerals in paying quantities does not satisfy the
requirement that oil, gas or some other mineral beproducedunder the
habendum clause in order to continue the lease in full force and effect
beyond the primary term."' 7  Moreover, production under the
habendum clause "should be understood to mean production in
paying quantities in the absence of a stipulation that it should be
production in paying quantities."' 8 A Texas court-faced with a lease
wherein the words "whether or not in paying quantities" were stricken
from the habendum clause-found that the lease nonetheless
contemplated production in "paying quantities."' 9
II. JURISPRUDENTIAL TEST
A. Historical Approach Developed by Jurisprudence
The jurisprudence of Louisiana had developed the test in
connection with inquiries into whether production is in "paying
quantities," that production must be such as to the interest of the
lessor as well as with respect to the interest of the lessee. The two
"prongs" of this test-first, as to the lessor, and second, as to the
lessee-have been called the "objective" standard and the
"subjective" standard.2"
B. First "Prong "-The Objective Standard
The first prong of the test-an examination of the relative worth
or sufficiency to the lessor of the production royalties as compared to
16. 197 La. 237, 243, 1 So. 2d 89, 91 (1941) (emphasis added).
17. Landry v. Flaitz, 245 La. 223,232, 157 So. 2d 892, 895 (1963) (emphasis
added).
18. Id. at 233, 157 So. 2d at 895.
19. Peacock v. Schroeder, 846 S.W.2d 905,908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1993) ("Thus,
we attach no significance to the striking of 'whether or not in paying quantities.'
The lease requires production in paying quantities."). This holding is actually
consistent with the principle of contractual interpretation which dictates that words
which are obliterated or stricken are to be "deemed not written." See Patrick S.
Ottinger, Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 60 La. L. Rev. 765, 772-73(2000).
20. Battle, supra note 1, § 14.05.
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the other payments contemplated by the lease terms-is a necessary
corollary to the fact that, in Louisiana, royalties are characterized as
"rent., 2' The courts feel that, in order to sustain the validity of the
lease, it is necessary to determine that the lessor is receiving "rent. 22
The initial inquiry is a comparison of the production royalties paid
to the lessor under the lease to other lease payments received by the
lessor, e.g., the bonus, delay rentals, or shut-in gas payments.23 If the
comparison is favorable to the lessor or, as the courts state it, if the
royalties constitute a "serious consideration" to the lessor for the
maintenance of the lease, the inquiry stops and any attack on the lease
as not having been produced in "paying quantities" is foreclosed.24
C. Second "Prong "-The Subjective Standard
If, on the other hand, the comparison of the royalty payments to
the other monetary benefits inuring to the lessor under the lease is
unfavorable, then the second prong in the test is reached. The essence
of the inquiry at this point is whether the conduct of the lessee as
manifested by the circumstances would indicate speculation on its
part. That is to say, can the production secured, and being secured,
be said to be in "paying quantities" with respect to the interest of the
lessee?
If the lease is producing in quantities sufficient to meet current
operating expenses and yield a small profit to the working interest
owner, then the test is satisfied and, again, production is said to be
commercial or in "paying quantities." It is appropriate to observe
that, in the application of this phase of the jurisprudential test, one is
not concerned with recovery of investment costs.2 As long as a small
21. Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773,57 So. 2d 679, 1 Oil & Gas
Rep. 587 (1952) ("Under this application of the law, it was inevitable that when the
question arose as to the nature of royalty, it was held to be rent in the form of a
portion of the produce of the land ...... "). See La. Min. Code art. 123, La. R.S.
31:123 (2004) (". . . royalties paid to the lessor on production are rent.").
22. See La. Civ. Code art. 2710 (2004) ("The lessee is bound... [t]o pay the
rent at the terms agreed on.").
23. Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926).
24. Vance v. Hurley, 215 La. 805, 41 So. 2d 724 (1949); Noel Estate, Inc. v.
Murray, 223 La. 387, 65 So. 2d 886, 2 Oil & Gas Rep. 951 (1953).
25. See Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 511 (1942) ("If a well pays a profit,
even small, over operating expenses, it produces in paying quantities, though it may
never repay its costs, and the enterprise as a whole may prove unprofitable."); see
also Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., Ltd., 191 P.2d 129, 133 (Cal. Ct. App.
1948):
By the great weight of authority, the term, 'paying quantities,' when used
in the extension clause of an oil lease habendum means production in
quantities sufficient to yield a return in excess of operating costs, even
though drilling and equipment costs may never be repaid and the
2005] 639
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profit (above and beyond current operating costs) is yielded, such
profit is dedicated to recoupment of investment costs, and the well is
deemed to be producing in "paying quantities."
As was hereinabove seen, the rule that production must be in
"paying quantities" evolved so as to prevent speculation in mineral
interests and, correspondingly, to deny a mineral lessee the right to
effectively remove minerals from commerce. When, in applying the
jurisprudential test to a particular factual situation, it becomes
necessary to reach the second prong (for the reason that the
comparison of royalties to other benefits of the lessor was
unfavorable), then the courts are actually concerned with the status of
development of the lease. That is, the courts will usually look
favorably upon the past operational history of the lessee where the
lessee has acted as a reasonable, prudent operator in the development
of the leased premises. This is notwithstanding a less than favorable
comparison of lessor's royalties to other benefits to the lessor. If the
lessee has done all that could be done under the circumstances in
terms of development of the lease, then the lease would be saved.
The following cases seem to support this observation.
In Green v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, the lessors sued the
lessee for "the annulment of a gas and oil lease."26 The lessee had
drilled one well. The court noted that such well "produced so little
oil that it would have been abandoned, if the defendant company had
not been in a position to have it attended to at no appreciable expense
by the employees who attended to the other wells in the vicinity."27
The defendant resisted on the basis that "oil is being produced in
paying quantities, since defendant company is getting some little of
it from said well at practically no expense to itself and therefore in
paying quantities. '"2 The supreme court held that the "defendant
company having announced the intention not to develop, the lease
must be annulled."29 Clearly, the lack of development motivated the
court to disregard the fact that production was being obtained at little
or no cost to the lessee.
In another case, Caldwell v. Alton Oil Company, the lessee failed
the first prong of the test.3" The initial comparison was unfavorable
($33.33 in royalties in a year as compared to a $500 bonus). The
court then considered the sufficiency of development of the leased
premises. Observing that the lessee had assumed a drilling obligation
which had not been satisfied, it was concluded that the lease had
undertaking considered as a whole may ultimately result in a loss.
26. 146 La. 935, 936, 84 So. 211,211 (1920).
27. Id. at 937, 84 So. at 212.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 938, 84 So. at 212.
30. 161 La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926).
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expired by its terms, the implication being that the courts are not so
deeply concerned with the comparison of royalties to other payments
to the lessor in cases where there has been a reasonable development
under the circumstances.3 -
In Smith v. Sun Oil Co., Inc., the lessor sued his lessee to declare
the mineral lease to have terminated.3 2 It was admitted that "no oil
whatever has been produced from the land since September, 1926, but
it is contended that the land is still producing gas in paying
quantities."33 There existed on the land two shallow wells, capable
of producing gas. "But [said the court] the fact is that there is no
market for said gas, that the only gas used from said wells was a few
thousand feet which were used by the driller of said well."34 The court
found that the lease had lapsed, stating:
We are of opinion that lease has now ceased to produce either
oil or gas in paying quantities. Where the output of a gas well
either cannot be, or in fact is not, disposed of, the well cannot
be said to be a paying proposition either for the owner of the
land or for the owner of the well; and, where a well has
ceased to be a paying proposition for any one concerned, it
has clearly ceased to produce gas in paying quantities. We
think the lease has expired by its very terms.'
In Logan v. Tholl Oil Co., Inc., the lessor sued the lessee to
declare a mineral lease to have been terminated because of failure to
produce in "paying quantities."36 Although the production from the
lease was initially significant, it steadily declined "to such an extent
that four wells were abandoned and the remaining four are small
pumpers. The average production of these four wells during the
fifteen months immediately preceding the filing of this suit was
slightly over 1-1/3 barrels per day, or 1/3 of a barrel each, which
yielded plaintiff as royalty slightly over $5 per month., 37 The court
compared these amounts to the bonus and rental and found the
production to be insufficient to continue the lease.3' The court had no
occasion to reach the second prong of the test.
In Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate, the lessor challenged a
mineral lease on a variety of grounds. 39 As to the contention that the
31. Id.
32. 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931).
33. Id. at 656, 135 So. at 15.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 189 La. 645, 180 So. 473 (1938).
37. Id. at651, 180 So. at475.
38. Id.
39. 195 La. 865, 197 So. 583 (1940).
20051
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lease ceased to produce in "paying quantities," the court found that
royalties paid to the lessors on gas amounted to $8,476.84 and on oil
amounted to $100.00 per month for a six month period. Citing
Logan, the court observed that "the well appears to have been a
profitable commercial well bringing in a net profit to the lessees and
furnishing an adequate consideration to the lessors for the
continuance of the lease. 4 ° The lessee was entitled to continue
production.
This implication is given credence by a review of the decision in
Vance v. Hurley. In Vance, the entire lease had been included in a
compulsory unit. Although the first comparison was again unfavorable
(52¢ per acre royalties vis-a-vis $10.00 per acre bonus), the court
concluded that all possible development had occurred by virtue of
unitization and the lease was upheld.42
In Noel Estate, Inc. v. Murray, the plaintiff-lessor sought
cancellation of a mineral lease.43 The lessee had obtained production
on ten acres of a sixty-acre lease. The court held that production was
in "paying quantities" as to both the lessor and lessee and, thus, upheld
the lease. The test in determining if a lease is producing in "paying
quantities," as to lessee, is "whether the producing well or wells
involved would provide a net profit to the lessee," and, as to lessor,
whether it will "furnish an adequate consideration to the lessor, the
income of the latter from royalties being especially compared with the
sums that he received in payment for the lease originally and for annual
delay rentals." The court found it unnecessary to conduct a serious
inquiry into the reasonableness of development inasmuch as the initial
comparison was most favorable (royalties of $12 to $20 per acre as
opposed to a $2.50 per acre bonus). The lease as to these ten acres
was upheld on the basis of this favorable comparison.
Professor George W. Hardy, Il, the Reporter for the Louisiana
Mineral Code, was of the view that the initial comparison feature of the
test is merely "an evidentiary signal." If favorable, the inquiry stops
and the lease is maintained. If unfavorable, it becomes necessary to go
further and review the question of adequacy of development under the
circumstances. The conclusion to be reached after a review of the pre-
Code jurisprudence in this area of the mineral law is well stated in the
comment under Article 124 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, as follows:
40. Id. at 896, 197 So. at 593.
41. 215 La. 805, 41 So. 2d 724 (1949).
42. Id.
43. 223 La. 387, 65 So. 2d 886, 2 Oil & Gas Rep. 951 (1953).
44. Id. at 392, 65 So. 2d at 888.
45. Id. at 393-95, 65 So. 2d at 888-89.
46. La. Min. Code art. 124, cmt., La. R.S. 31:124, cmt. (2004).
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Viewing the totality of the jurisprudence in this area, it appears
that the thrust of the Louisiana cases is that (1) the lease must
be producing in such manner as to yield a profit to the working
interest over current operating expenses; and (2) the amount of
the royalties being paid to the lessor must be sufficient to dispel
any notion that the lessee has been holding the lease for
speculative purposes and is doing all that might be reasonably
expected to maximize his profit on his total investment or
minimize any loss thereon.4
Ill. APPLICATION OF THE SECOND "PRONG" OF THE TEST
A. Introduction
Because the first prong is objective, monetary considerations
accruing to the lessor either are, or they are not, serious.
Additionally, this first prong has essentially been abandoned in
Louisiana under the codal formulation and, therefore, merits little
further discussion. It is appropriate, however, to give consideration
to the jurisprudential treatment of the second, or subjective, prong.
This is where the action is post-1975.
B. Contrary Interests of the Lessor and of the Lessee
The inquiry at this second prong involves a comparison of the
"current operating costs"-- usually called lifting costs 4 8-with the
revenue stream inuring to the entire working interest, that is, the
portion of revenue remaining after deducting only the lessor's royalty
share.49 Because the revenue side of the ledger is determinable solely
by reference to the lease contract itself (relevant revenue equals one
hundred percent minus only the stipulated royalty), a production in
"paying quantities" case focuses essentially on the expense side of the
ledger.
In examining the costs which might be of a "current operating"
nature, it is helpful at the outset to identify the contrary interests of
the lessor and of the lessee in disputes over whether a lease is
generating production in "paying quantities." The lessor would want
47. Id.
48. This term has reference to those costs incurred by the operator and which
are "necessary to lift the oil from the ground." Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604
P.2d 854, 857 n.8, 65 Oil & Gas Rep. 530 (Okla. 1980).
49. See infra Part III.F.
6432005]
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to consider as many items of cost as possible so as to require a greater
amount of production before it could be said that current operating
costs were being met. Obviously, the lessor is well served to "load
it up."
Conversely, from the point of view of the lessee, and so as to
permit a smaller amount of production to satisfy the requirement of
being in "paying quantities," it is necessary that fewer items of
expense be considered. The less expenses considered, the less the
production necessary to meet them on a current basis. Clearly, the
lessee will challenge certain expenses as not being lifting costs, and,
hence, will try to limit or minimize the relevant block of expenses to
be measured against revenue. This tug of war is typically at the heart
of a production in a "paying quantities" case.
In evaluating the production with respect to the working interest,
it is necessary to give consideration to what expenses are considered
as being current operating costs, what portion of the revenue stream is
pertinent, and what qualifies as a "small profit" (assuming, of course,
that relevant revenue exceeds qualifying costs). By their nature,
production in paying quantities cases often turn on a characterization
of items of expense and are usually expert-intensive. But first, it is
appropriate to consider the question: from where is the relevant data
to be obtained?
C. Source of Relevant Data
The lessor has the burden of proving its entitlement to lease
cancellation as a consequence of the failure of production in "paying
quantities."5 Except in the case where a sophisticated lessor has
negotiated a lease clause which requires the lessee to afford the lessor
the opportunity to review the lessee's books and records,5 the lessor
has no effective means, prior to filing suit and availing itself of
50. Frazier v. Justiss Mears Oil Co., Inc., 391 So. 2d 485, 68 Oil & Gas Rep.
652 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied 395 So. 2d 340 (La. 1980) ("In any event, the
burden ofproving grounds for the cancellation of a mineral lease is on the lessor.").
51. An example of such a clause, encountered by the author in a sophisticated
mineral lease contract, is, as follows:
Lessor shall have the right, at all times, to inspect the books and records
of Lessee, including without limitation, the gross production, the amounts
saved, sold or used, the sales price thereof; the amounts and values of all
other production, all sales contracts and all other data proper for the
settlement of accounts between the parties hereto. Lessee shall make all
of such records and data available to Lessor on request, at Lessee's
principal office, for examination and copying, at all reasonable times, as
well as all other records, contracts, receipts, invoices, documents, books,
including title data, or papers in the possession or under the control of
Lessee pertaining to the testing, exploration, development, operation, the
production and disposition of such production therefrom.
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discovery, to ascertain the expense and revenue data necessary to
pursue a claim that the lease has lapsed because of a failure to produce
m "paying quantities." Although the lessee is obligated to disclose
certain revenue information on the check stub,52 there is no legal
obligation to provide expense information.
It is obvious that a production in paying quantities case will involve
close scrutiny of the books and records of the operator in order to
determine what costs and expenses were incurred in the operation of
the lease in question. Quite often, the manner in which an operator has
characterized an item of cost or expense on its books and records will
be used by the lessor against the operator. However, it is equally clear
that the characterization of an item of cost or expense for purposes of
the issue of lease maintenance may not accurately comport with the
characterization of the same item for other purposes.
For example, a given item of cost or expense might be treated one
way for purposes of joint interest billing under a joint operating
agreement, and yet another way for purposes of filing tax returns, and
still another way for purposes of financial accounting or reporting,
and may or may not be considered in calculating a net profits interest
(if such exists), and entirely differently for purposes of administration
of the mineral lease within the lessor-lessee relationship. Context
matters here.
There is nothing nefarious about the different treatment of the
same item of cost or expense when viewed or examined in the context
of different relationships. This fact was well stated by one
commentator:
Since we are obliged to deal with the accounting facts of
life, let's start out by frankly and intelligently recognizing that
there is no stigma attached to "keeping two sets of books."
The marvel would be if a sizeable company, in this day and
age, could get by with only two sets. It is not at all unusual to
find that the books kept by a company for the purpose of
internal cost accounting will vary considerably from the
books which Uncle Sam requires for income tax purposes.
And, . . . , the accounting treatment in preparation of an
F.P.C. cost case would certainly be different from the
treatment on either the annual statement or the tax return.
This is perfectly legitimate. In fact the difference in use of the
figures requires different handling.
Therefore, it should come as no surprise if you find that an
oil and gas operator keeps separate figures on the lifting
52. La. Min. Code art. 212.31, La. R.S. 31:212.31 (2004).
2005]
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expense of his wells which do not resemble those on his
F.P.C., tax, or annual report statements.
The most obvious example of this difference is in the
handling of intangible drilling costs. Many operators have
elected to "expense" these intangibles for the purpose of
computing income taxes. Thus in the early life of a producing
lease, where there is a lot of drilling, the "expense" of these
intangible drilling costs may well exceed the proceeds from
production for months or years. Yet by definition such well
costs must be ignored in our determination of paying
quantities under the habendum clause. You can readily see
that such a lease may have current income far in excess of
lifting expense and still show an operating loss on the tax
books.
The paying quantities rule set up by the courts goes to the
substance of the case and is not concerned with mere form.
Thus it is necessary to look past the mere debit and credit
book entries in every instance and inquire into the essential
character of the particular transactions which gave rise to
those entries.53
This notion-that the absence of uniform, "one size fits all"
accounting principles justifies (if not mandates) the different
treatment of items of cost or expense for different purposes, in
different contexts-has received judicial approbation. In Mason v.
LaddPetroleum Corporation, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma said,
Neither can the determination of the issue rest with
accounting practices, that is, how such expenses are carried
on the books of the leasehold owner-operator. Until such
time as accounting practices become standardized, generally
accepted accounting practices may lead to one result, whereas
equally accepted accounting practices, using acceptable but
alternate methods and practices, can result in an opposite
result.5
4
For the reasons suggested by the foregoing passage, the fact that
in the joint operating agreement between the parties working interest
parties might characterize a certain item of cost or expense as
chargeable is not dispositive of the issue. The Mason Court held that
[t]he fact that operators under a joint operating agreement
generally treat such expenses as chargeable inter se, does not,
as plaintiff contends, establish a basis for including them as
53. Cage, supra note 1, at 68.
54. 630 P.2d 1283, 1285, 70 Oil & Gas Rep. 586 (Okla. 1981).
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chargeable expenses in determining whether a well is a
producer, both because no joint operating agreement was here
involved, and because even if there were, such expenses
would still be too indirectly and too remotely related to lifting
costs. 55
In view of the foregoing, it is self-evident that an accountant or
joint interest billing auditor is a necessary participant in the team of
experts in a production in paying quantities case.
D. What Period of Time Is to be Considered?
Over what period of time is the issue of production in paying
quantities to be determined? Production occurs daily, yet expenses
to "lift" the product may be incurred daily, weekly, monthly
or-taxes and insurance being examples-annually. The principle of
amortization is obviously available, but the question is begged: Over
what period of time should the expenses be spread? Clearly, a
snapshot of one day's worth of production is not a reasonable
measure of production as it is too susceptible to anomalies of the
moment.
One commentator has stated, with respect to the "relevant period"
to be considered:
Louisiana cases seem to have been inclined to consider
relatively long periods and have not apparently laid down
many limiting rules as to time; nor does there appear much
discussion of the particular reasons for considering particular
periods of time. Since in Louisiana the lessors [sic] royalties
are considered as rent, the courts seem to take the view that a
longer period, or perhaps the entire term of production, is
peculiarly appropriate to consider in this connection.
It has been well suggested that the courts should consider only
such period of past production as would shed light on the
present status of production, and then only as one of the
factors in determining that present status.57
55. Id. at 1286. See also Hininger v. Kaiser, 738 P.2d 137, 141, 94 Oil & Gas
Rep. 167 (Okla. 1987) ("It is, therefore, unnecessary to examine the terms of the
Joint Operating Agreement because that agreement will have no effect on what
expenses are, or are not to be, deducted as lifting costs.").
56. See John L. Wilson, Accounting for Production in Paying Quantities
Under the Habendum Clause, Petroleum Acct. & Fin. Mgmt. J., Summer 1991, at
130.
57. Wells, supra note 1, at 100.
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Clifton v. Koontz instructs that profitability is to be determined
over "a reasonable period of time under the circumstances."58 The
Louisiana courts seem to consider "the quantity of minerals produced
during the relevant period... rather than the quantity sold during
such period."59 In any event, it is necessary to show the value of the
production during the relevant period.6°
E. What Expenses Are to be Considered?
As to what constitutes a current operating expense, it seems that
those expenditures incurred as a direct result of the leasehold
operations would be considered, "the relevant concept being that the
basic limitation on any expense to be considered is that it must be
traceable to the actual expense of production of the well's product,
once the capability of the well to produce is assured. 61
1. Capital Costs
First, we will begin by identifying that category of costs which are
not to be considered. Costs incurred in seeking tofind production are
not operating costs and, hence, are not relevant.62 In accounting
jargon, these are sometimes called "sunk costs."
Reworking expenses are not to be considered as lifting expenses.
In Pshigoda v. Texaco, Inc., the Texas Court of Appeals stated that a
"reworking expenditure is analogous, and closely related, to the initial
drilling expenses. It is usually a one time, single expense item, that
... is treated as a capital investment." '63
2. Labor, Equipment, and Material Costs
Labor, equipment and materials consumed, handling costs on well
location and power utilized at the well site would qualify as costs to
be considered.' In Lege v. Lea Exploration, Inc., the lessors sued the
58. Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691, 10 Oil & Gas Rep. 1109 (1959).
59. Wells, supra note 1, at 99.
60. See, e.g., Stacyv. Midstates Oil Corp., 214 La. 173, 36 So. 2d 714 (1948)
(case remanded where court was "unable to make an intelligent decision.., without
having the benefit of evidence as to the value of the oil produced" during the
relevant period of time.).
61. Battle, supra note 1, §14.05(1)(c).
62. See Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 511 (1942); Transport Oil Co. v.
Exeter Oil Co., Ltd., 191 P.2d 129, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
63. 703 S.W.2d 416, 419, 90 Oil & Gas Rep. 135 (Tex. App. 1986).
64. Reese Enters., Inc. v. Lawson, 553 P.2d 885, 898, 56 Oil & Gas Rep. 517
(1976) ("All direct costs encountered, whether paid or accrued, in operating the
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lessees to declare a mineral lease to have terminated because of a
failure to produce in "paying quantities. 65 The lessors contended that
certain identified costs and expenses were to be characterized as a
lifting expense. The issue was stated by the court, as follows:
The heart of the dispute calls into question the legal
classification of certain expenditures by the lessee.
Allocation of these expenditures to the category of "operating
expenses," which are deductible from a producing properties
[sic] gross revenues, could result in our finding that the well
did not consistently "produce in paying quantities" and a
forfeiture of the lease at some point during the years 1981
through 1984; their classification as "repair and remedial" or
"equipment" capital costs, on the other hand, would lead us
to affirm the lower court's conclusion that the well never
ceased to "produce in paying quantities. '"66
The principal disputed item of expenditure was the cost incurred
in converting an existing well to a saltwater disposal system. For a
period of time, the lessees disposed of the saltwater by trucking it off
of the leased premises, the cost of which would be treated as
operating costs. The lessors argued that, by analogy, "so should be
the expenditures which replace them."67
The court stated that they were "unable to accept the premise of
plaintiffs position, that the nature of a lessee's cost is determined
strictly by the substitution accomplished.6 8 Rather, the classification
of a given item of expense as being "ordinary and recurring or
extraordinary and largely non-recurring in nature" was determinative
as to whether that expense item should be considered as a lifting
expense.69 Since the disputed costs were treated as "extraordinary
and largely non-recurring in nature," the costs were disregarded and
the lease was maintained.70
lease as a prudent operator are taken into account.").
65. 93-605 (La. App. 3d Cir.), 631 So. 2d 716, 130 Oil & Gas Rep. 329, writ
denied 94-0450 (La. 1994), 635 So. 2d 1112. In the interest of full disclosure, the
author represented the operator in this case.
66. Id. at 717.
67. Id. at 718.
68. Id. at 719.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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3. Depreciation
The cases treating the subject of depreciation as an eligible item
of expense to be deducted are, to be kind, less than consistent."' The
better way to view this issue was explained by one commentator:
It is submitted that it is unquestionably proper to draw a line
between the initial costs required to establish production and
the costs of continuing to produce after production has been
established. It is also submitted that the court is on sound
ground in concluding that only lifting costs should be taken
into account in determining whether or not the lease is
producing in paying quantities for purposes of the habendum
clause. It is also submitted, however, that the identification
of lifting costs is made easier by first identifying and
eliminating from consideration the costs of drilling and
completion and other costs required to establish production in
the first instance. This method avoids the difficulty of dealing
with equipment that is required in drilling and completing the
well and also required in operating the well. Accordingly,
once it is determined that the costs of casing, tubing, and the
Christmas tree are costs of completing the well and preparing
it for production, such costs would be eliminated from
consideration in determining paying quantities. Depreciation
on such equipment should not be taken into account, because
it is an accounting method of spreading the cost of equipment
over its useful life that amounts to deducting costs of such
equipment piecemeal. 2
In view of the foregoing, it seems logical that depreciation is not
to be so included if the equipment to which it relates is a part of the
drilling and completion expenses.73
As to equipment and material not consumed, a Texas case permits
consideration of the actual depreciation on these items." Or, as said
71. Compare Ross Explorations, Inc. v. Freedom Energy, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 511
(Ark. 2000) (Arkansas Supreme Court stated that the "better view" is to exlcude
depreciation as a cost of operation) with cases cited in footnote 74, infra.
72. Eugene 0. Kuntz, 2 A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 26.7(1).
73. Bales v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 362 S.W.2d 388, 17 Oil & Gas Rep. 811
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1962). See also Mason v. Ladd Petroleum Corp., 630
P.2d 1283, 1285, 70 Oil & Gas Rep. 586 (Okla. 1981).
74. Skelly Oil Co. v. Archer, 356 S.W.2d 774, 781, 16 Oil & Gas Rep. 650
(Tex. 1961). Cf Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., Ltd., 191 P.2d 129, 134 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist. 1948) ("There is room for argument, however, that depreciation might
reasonably be treated as an operating cost."); Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604
P.2d 854, 857, 65 Oil & Gas Rep. 530 (Okla. 1980) ("[D]epreciation should be
mandatorily included as an item of lifting expense in determining whether there is
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by another court in Texas, "to show the depreciation allowed in the
paying quantities calculation, landowners must show the cost of the
particular equipment and its rate of depreciation."75
4. District Expenses
The propriety of including expenses of district offices-salaries
and employees' fringe benefits-has been considered by the courts.
Here, the question is, how high up the corporate chain of command
can you go? Who is the highest corporate employee whose costs
might, in part, be attributed to this particular well?
To frame this issue by way of illustration, it is only logical that if
the lessee is a large, multi-national major, integrated oil and gas
company, which operates and manages significant producing assets
in many jurisdictions (domestic and foreign), a lessor would not be
successful in attributing any expenses incurred above a rather low
supervisory level in the corporate structure. That is the easy case.
If, however, the lessee is a small, one or two person operation-a
so-called "mom and pop" shop-the probability is greater that some
portion of all costs and expenses are in play, and this is all the more
so if the company only operates one well.
If that small company operates two fields, one with seven wells
and one with one well (the well in litigation), does one allocate one-
half (one out of two fields) or one-eighth (one out of eight total wells)
of district expenses? A court might find helpful the expert testimony
of an accountant versed in the financial aspects of corporate structures
or a human resources expert or an expert familiar with COPAS
standards or custom in the industry.
Nevertheless, in Mason, it was held that "district expenses" were
"too indirectly and too remotely related to defendant's lifting or
producing operations.., to be included in determining whether the
well operates at a profit."76 The court also observed that the expense
of a district office "relates to and is made necessary by reason of
corporate convenience or necessity, and not by reason of anything
necessary or convenient for the lifting operations of the well."77
production in 'paying quantities."'); Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 618 P.2d 844, 848, 67 Oil
& Gas Rep. 360 (Kan. 1980) (holding otherwise and rejecting the rationale of
Stewart).
75. Evans v. Gulf Oil Corp., 840 S.W.2d 500, 505, 125 Oil & Gas Rep. 178
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992).
76. Mason, 630 P.2d at 1285.
77. Id.
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One court held that, because "administrative and district expenses
would continue whether or not [the well in question] was producing,
then such expenses should not be considered as overhead.' 8
5. Administrative Overhead Expenses
Other expenses, although not directly and exclusively related to
the operation of a particular well, such as overhead and administrative
costs (including postage, office supplies, telephones, etc.), have been
urged by landowners to be deductible. However, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court-noting a "diversity of views within the oil
industry"-has stated that, "in determining whether a well is a
producer, such administrative overhead expenses should be
excluded."79 Nevertheless, legal expenses and insurance directly
attributable to that particular lease could be considered.
6. Operator's Overhead Expenses
In Menoah Petroleum, Inc. v. McKinney, plaintiff-lessee filed a
suit to enjoin defendant-lessor from blocking plaintiff's access to a
well not located on defendant's property, but located on property
covered by a lease owned by plaintiff which lease included
defendant's property.8" Defendant asserted that plaintiff's mineral
lease had terminated for failure to produce in "paying quantities."
Additionally, defendant contended that the lease had also lapsed because
of non-production for two months.
The trial court ruled for the defendant-lessor, denying the lessee's
application for injunctive relief and holding that the lease had lapsed. On
appeal, the plaintiff-lessee complained that the trial court had placed on
it the burden to show that the lease was in effect, rather than placing it on
the lessor to prove that the lease had terminated. The court, in reliance
upon Frazier v. Justiss Mears Oil Company, Inc., agreed with the
plaintiff and held that the "burden of proof was upon [lessor] to show
that the lease affecting her property had lapsed due to failure to produce
in paying quantities after expiration of the primary term."8" The court
then proceeded to "determine whether [the lessor] proved that [the
lesseel's lease lapsed due to failure to produce in paying quantities in
1986.82
78. Ladd Petroleum Corp. v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co., 695 S.W.2d 99, 108, 87 Oil
& Gas Rep. 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1985).
79. Mason, 630 P.2d at 1286 (Okla. 1981).
80. 545 So. 2d 1216 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
81. Id. at 1220.
82. Id.
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The court reviewed the revenue and expenses and concluded that the
lease ceased to produce in "paying quantities." In so doing, the court
further stated that, where a unit is being operated by a third party other
than the lessee, it is appropriate to consider overhead expenses as
operating expenses for purposes of determining whether a well is
producing in "paying quantities."
In the subsequent case of Edmundson Brothers Partnership v.
Montex Drilling Co., the defendant-lessee argued, in reliance on Menoah,
that "the operator's overhead must be excluded from the calculation of
whether the Edmundson No. 1 well produced in paying quantities."83
However, the court found that it need not reach "the question of whether
operating expenses should be considered in connection with this issue,"
stating that, even excluding that expense, "the lease did not produce in
paying quantities."' This holding was made in the face of a finding that
the "lease produced a profit of$139.00 per month for the eighteen-month
period preceding the filing of the suit."85 Although the court did not
explain why this "profit"--even if considered "small"--was not
sufficient to uphold the lease, the court's ruling was probably motivated
by its finding of a lack of development on the part of the lessee.
7. Marketing Expenses
An implication in Hunter v. Booker suggests that costs incurred
by the lessee in treating the product so as to make it marketable is a
relevant consideration.86  However, the court did not engage in
extended discussion of this issue because "the cost of this operation
is not mentioned in the testimony."87
The better view is that expenses incurred by the operator in
rendering the product marketable should not be deductible. First,
properly speaking, these expenses cannot be considered as lifting
costs since they are incurred, if at all, only after the product has been
"lifted" and thereby reduced to possession at the wellhead;88 they are
incurred after the fact of production, not in connection with the
obtaining of that production.89
83. 98-1564 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999), 731 So. 2d 1049, 1058, 142 Oil & Gas
Rep. 266.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 158 La. 690, 694, 104 So. 618, 620 (1925).
87. Id.
88. See La. Min. Code art. 7, La. R.S. 31:7 (2004) ("Minerals are reduced to
possession when they are under physical control that permits delivery to another.").
89. See Pray v. Premier Petroleum, Inc., 662 P.2d 255,260, 76 Oil & Gas Rep.
449 (Kan. 1983) ("[C]apital expenditures for building a pipeline are improper
considerations for determining whether a gas well will produce in paying quantities
2005] 653
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Next, the lessee is under an implied covenant to prudently market
the product9" and should not be penalized for taking those necessary
and reasonable steps to discharge this duty. Absent bad faith, any
tension between the lessee's implied duty to market the product and
the duty to prudently operate for the mutual benefit of the parties
should ordinarily be resolved in favor of the operator.
Finally, in most instances, these expenses are borne
proportionately by the royalty owner and the working interest owner.
Since each party bears its own share of these expenses, it would be
inequitable to effectively shift, for purposes of a "paying quantities"
analysis, this burden to the operator by requiring it to deduct from its
share of revenue the cost of marketing.
It should be noted, however, that Williams and Meyers, while
observing that there "is some doubt concerning the question whether
marketing expenses are to be included as costs of the operation," then
state that it "would seem that these are properly included in the
calculation since unless the product is marketed there can be no
paying production."'" One might quarrel with this reasoning for,
under that standard, drilling and completion costs likewise should be
considered since unless the well is drilled and completed there can be
no paying production.
8. Ad Valorem Taxes
Advalorem taxes should be considered since "[t]hese annually recurring
taxes are expenses which a prudent operator cannot ignore in an evaluation
of whether to continue to operate the lease. 92
F. What Revenue Is to be Considered?
It is irrelevant as to how the lessee might have distributed the net
revenue interest attributable to the working interest. Thus, overriding
royalty interests, production payments, or other burdens or interests
created by the lessee would not be taken into account to the extent that
the net revenue interest allocable to the working interest would be
diminished thereby. The comparison to lifting costs is made to the full
working interest stream, without regard to the various revenue burdens
on that working interest.93 As stated in Clifton v. Koontz, "[t]he entire
under a shut-in royalty clause.").
90. Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101,3 So. 2d 289 (1941).
91. Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 604.6(b).
92. Menoah Petroleum, Inc. v. McKinney, 545 So. 2d 1216, 1221, 105 Oil &
Gas Rep. 242 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
93. See Hininger v. Kaiser, 738 P.2d 137, 140, 94 Oil & Gas Rep. 167 (Okla.
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income attributable to the contractual working interest created by the
original lease is to be considered."'94
To illustrate (with an admittedly extreme example), if a lease well
produces $4,000.00 per month in product sales (to the 8/8ths) and if the
lease provides for a one-fourth (1/4) royalty to the lessor, the lessee
receives three-fourths (3/4), or $3,000.00 per month in gross proceeds
(out of which all operating expenses are to be paid). If the well
produces excessive amounts of salt water which must be hauled off in
trucks, the lifting costs are $2,500.00 per month. Because the monthly
proceeds to the lessee ($3,000.00) exceed monthly lifting costs
($2,500.00), the lease is producing in "paying quantities." If the lease
is subject to a one-fourth (1/4) overriding royalty interest to a third
party, then the lessee's net interest in production (1/2) yields $2,000.00
per month, which is not sufficient to cover monthly lifting costs
($2,500.00). Nevertheless, the lease is producing in "paying quantities"
because expenses are, in the words of Article 124 of the Mineral Code,
to be measured against the "total original right of the lessee to share in
production under the lease,"95 or three-fourths, rather than the lessee's
actual net revenue interest (in this case, one-half).
In Leaderbrand and Hardy v. Shallow Oil Co., the sublessor of a
mineral lease stipulated that "the lease is paying in commercial
quantities to the landowner, lessor, and the defendant, sub-lessee."'96
Notwithstanding this admission, the sublessor sought to cancel the
sublease "on the ground that it was not producing in commercial
quantities."97 Upholding the sublease, the court stated:
Certainly this production could not be governed by the
amount received for the small overriding interest. The
plaintiffs seem to think that the consideration that they paid
for the sub-lease and overriding royalty, and the expenses
incurred by them such as book-keeping, taxes, and
depreciation, should be the determining factor of whether or
not these wells are producing in commercial quantities.98
If it were to hold otherwise, said the court, "the rights of the lessor
and the operating sub-lessee could be easily destroyed." 99
1987) ("Overriding royalties, like costs of drilling, are part of the capital investment
instead of part of the lifting costs.").
94. 325 S.W.2d 684, 693, 10 Oil & Gas Rep. 1109 (1959).
95. La. Min. Code art. 124, La. R.S. 31:124 (2004).
96. 234 La. 796,801, 101 So. 2d 673,675,9 Oil & Gas Rep. 475 (1958). See
also Vance v. Hurley, 215 La. 805, 41 So. 2d 724 (1949). A "stipulation" is a
"judicial confession" which "constitutes full proof against the party who made it."
La. Civ. Code art. 1853 (2004).
97. Leaderbrand, 234 La. at 801, 101 So. 2d at 675.
98. Id. at 802, 101 So. 2d at 675.
99. Id.
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G. How Much "Profit'" Is Necessary?
As to what constitutes a profit within the meaning of the rule, the
standard of evaluation again seems to be one of reasonableness. That
is to say, is it reasonable to continue to operate this particular well
under all relevant circumstances, when such production is yielding
this particular profit? The leading court decision on this
question-and the origin of Louisiana's current codal
formulation-seems to be a Texas Supreme Court case, where the
court said:
[T]he standard by which paying quantities is determined is
whether or not under all the relevant circumstances a
reasonably prudent operator would, for the purpose of making
a profit and not merely for speculation, continue to operate a
well in the manner in which the well in question was
operated.
In determining paying quantities, in accordance with the
above standard, the trial court necessarily must take into
consideration all matters which would influence a reasonable
and prudent operator. Some of the factors are: The depletion
of the reservoir and the price for which the lessee is able to
sell his produce, the relative profitableness of other wells in
the area, the operating and marketing costs of the lease, his
net profit, the lease provisions, a reasonable period of time
under the circumstances, and whether or not the lessee is
holding the lease merely for speculative purposes.
The term "paying quantities" involves not only the
amount of production, but also the ability to market the
product (gas) at a profit. . . . Whether there is a reasonable
basis for the expectation of profitable returns from the well is
the test. If the quantity be sufficient to warrant the use of the
gas in the market, and the income therefrom is in excess of
the actual marketing cost, and operating costs, the production
satisfies the term 'in paying quantities.'100
IV. ENTER THE LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE
A. Introduction
Since 1975, the law relative to the sufficiency of the quantity of
100. Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684,691, 10 Oil & Gas Rep. 1109 (1959).
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production is contained in Articles 124 and 125 of the Louisiana
Mineral Code, which read:
Art. 124. When a mineral lease is being maintained by
production of oil or gas, the production must be in paying
quantities. It is considered to be in paying quantities when
production allocable to the total original right of the lessee to
share in production under the lease is sufficient to induce a
reasonably prudent operator to continue production in an
effort to secure a return on his investment or to minimize any
loss. 101
Art. 125. In applying Article 124, the amount of the royalties
being paid may be considered only insofar as it may show the
reasonableness of the lessee's expectation in continuing
production. The amount need not be a serious or adequate
equivalent for continuance of the lease as compared with the
amount of the bonus, rentals, or other sums paid to the
lessor.1
2
The change which this legislation accomplishes to the area of
mineral law under consideration is to suppress that phase of the test
which required a comparison of the lessor's benefits under the lease
contract to the amount of production royalties then being paid to the
lessor.
B. Retroactivity of Provisions of Louisiana Mineral Code
Some consideration must be given to the question as to whether
the provisions on this subject which are contained in the Louisiana
Mineral Code would apply to a mineral lease in existence on the
effective date of the new Code, January 1, 1975.
Article 214 of the Louisiana Mineral Code provides, "The
provisions of this Code shall apply to all mineral rights, including
those existing on the effective date hereof; but no provision may be
applied to divest already vested rights or to impair the obligation of
contracts."' 03
It might be argued that the changes effected by this new
legislation with respect to the requirement that production be in
"paying quantities" are substantive changes inasmuch as, depending
upon the particular circumstances, their application to a given factual
101. La. Min. Code art. 124, La. R.S. 31:124 (2004) (Second paragraph omitted
as not here pertinent).
102. Id. art. 125, La. R.S. 31:125 (2004).
103. Id. art. 214, La. R.S. 31:214 (2004).
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situation could operate to make the responsibilities of the lessee more
burdensome, or the rights of the lessor less favorable.
If such were determined to be the case by a court of law, the
constitution would prohibit the application of this legislation to
existing or vested rights."° On the other hand, one might contend
that the quoted article should be given literal application with the
result that the provisions of the Louisiana Mineral Code are to be
employed, and that the referenced constitutional provisions do not bar
their application.
In a proper case, this might be a serious question which is not
easily resolved. For present purposes, we pretermit further discussion
on this issue. 5
C. Jurisprudence Under the Mineral Code
In Smith v. West Virginia Oil & Gas Co., the court found that
"there was no production and marketing of minerals from the leased
premises in paying quantities" where the "lessor's royalty computed
upon an annual total production of $593 would amount to only 21 
per day for gas produced from the only well on the leased premises
during the year 1977 and the maintenance of the well required the
expenditure of $1,507.92." °6
In CCH, Inc. v. Heard, the lessee testified that "it cost about one-
half barrel of oil a day to pay for the pumper or gauger, electricity and
handling of the salt water, excluding the cost of repairs."'0 7 From
this, the court determined "that the well had to produce 182 Y2 barrels
a year to pay for its own operation without yielding a profit."'018 The
court found that the well "produced only 127.5 barrels of oil during
the some 58 weeks of its operation," from which the court determined
that "it is clear that this well was operated by the lessee for over a
year at a considerable loss.' '1°9 "Consequently, it is rather obvious
that the production allocable to the lessee's working interest is not
sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent operator to continue efforts
104. La. Const. art. I, § 23 ("No... law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be enacted.").
105. For a thorough examination of this issue, see Winston R. Day, Applicability
of the New Mineral Code to Existing Mineral Rights, 22 Inst. on Min. L. 205
(1975).
106. 365 So. 2d 269,274,64 Oil & Gas Rep..294 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978), rev'd
and remanded 373 So. 2d 488 (La. 1979).
107. 410 So. 2d 1283, 1286, 72 Oil & Gas Rep. 471 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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to secure a return on his investment or to minimize his loss. ' 110 The
lease was declared terminated. Other cases decided since the
enactment of the Louisiana Mineral Code were noted above."'
V. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. What Constitutes "Production" in the First Place?
In Champlin Petroleum Company v. Mingo Oil Producers, the
lessee contended that the lease did not terminate "because of the 'free
flow' of oil from some wells into the holding tanks which was sold
at an alleged profit," and that such oil constituted "production (in
paying quantities) sufficient to extend the lease into the secondary
term."" The court rejected this contention, stating that, "[i]n no way
can it be said that merely allowing free flowing oil to accumulate for
approximately two years could constitute production as contemplated
by the parties in entering into the lease.'
B. "Freedom of Contract" to Abrogate or Modify Standard
Article 3 of the Mineral Code states that, "[u]nless expressly or
impliedly prohibited from doing so, individuals may renounce or
modify what is established in their favor by the provisions of this
Code if the renunciation or modification does not affect the rights of
others and is not contrary to the public good." '14  This article
expressly makes applicable to mineral leases (and other mineral
rights) the principle of freedom of contract which prevails generally
under Louisiana law.11
5
Does this liberality of contract permit parties to a mineral lease to
totally dispense with the requirement that production must be in
"paying quantities?" The short answer is, "No."
Given the policy underlying the rule-a disapproval of a lessee
operating in a speculative or selfish manner, without regard to the
rights of the lessor whose land or minerals would be held hostage-it
is unlikely that a court would allow, as stated the Louisiana Supreme
Court a century ago, a mere "dribbling" of oil or gas to suffice to
110. Id.
111. See Lege v. Lea Exploration, Inc., 93-605 (La. App. 3d Cir.), 631 So. 2d
716, 130 Oil & Gas Rep. 329; Edmundson Bros. P'ship v. Montex Drilling Co.,
98-1564 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999), 731 So. 2d 1049, 142 Oil & Gas Rep. 266.
112. 628 F. Supp. 557,560,91 Oil & Gas Rep. 417 (D. Wyo. 1986).
113. Id.
114. La. Min. Code art. 5, La. R.S. 31:5 (2004).
115. La. Civ. Code art. 1971 (2004) ("Parties are free to contract for any object
that is lawful, possible, and determined or determinable.").
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maintain a lease." 6 Support for this notion might be found in the
early cases which implied the "paying quantities" requirement in a
lease which did not even contain those precise words.
May the standard articulated in the Code be relaxed or altered?
The short answer is, "Probably so." As long as the parties do not
attempt to circumvent public policy by totally abrogating the "paying
quantities" requirement, no harm to the public good occurs where
parties stipulate what constitutes "paying quantities," particularly if
the standard is heightened, such that the burden to the lessee is
increased.
Therefore, the issue is where to place the line between the
permissible contractual alteration of the standard of production and
the impermissible abrogation of that requirement. Sooner or later, a
contractual alteration of the test which so emasculates the underlying
policy would not be allowed under the guise of a proper exercise of
freedom of contract.
C. Is Production to be Evaluated on a Well or on a Lease Basis?
No Louisiana case has considered the issue of whether production
in "paying quantities" is to be determined on a well-by-well basis, or
on the basis of the lease as a whole. If there are a number of wells on
the leased premises, some, but not all, of which are producing in
"paying quantities," to what extent, if any, is the lease subject to
termination?" 8
The issue was considered in a dissenting opinion on a denial of
rehearing in Gas Ridge, Inc. v. Suburban Agricultural Properties,
Inc."9 Although of dubious authority as precedent because of the
procedural context in which the issue was discussed, the court
observed that twelve oil wells were producing at a loss, whereas six
gas wells were producing a profit. Based upon this, and in view of
116. Anse LaButte (Le Danois) Oil & Minerals Co. v. Babb, 122 La. 415,426,
47 So. 754, 757 (1908) (noting that the parties to the lease "must have had in mind
something else than these dribblings of oil").
117. Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926).
118. A sophisticated, non-commercially printed lease form might require that the
lessee allocate a defined amount of acreage to each producing well-sometimes
called a "producing block"-thereby dividing the lease for lease maintenance
purposes. In such cases, the lease itself will answer this question.
119. 150 F.2d 1020, 1021 (5th Cir. 1945) (Sibley, J., dissenting).
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the terms of the habendum clause which would continue the lease "as
long thereafter as oil or gas is produced [in 'paying quantities']," the
dissenting judge stated that it
may well be that the gas wells pay, and if so the lease is not
at an end. ... I do not see that [the lessee] injures the lessor
by continuing to pump his unprofitable oil wells, even though
he thus loses his profits on the gas. The lessor gets his
royalties on both the gas and oil undiminished by the loss in
producing the oil.12 1
A lessee's argument that, "so long as one well on a lease operates
profitably, the condition for continuation of the lease is satisfied,"
was rejected by the fourth circuit in Imperial Colliery Company v.
Oxy USA, Inc. 21 The appellate court affirmed the finding that "the
entire Imperial lease had to produce gas in paying quantities in order
to survive automatic lease termination by operation of the habendum
clause.' 22
Williams and Meyers argue that public policy should dictate that
profitable wells be allowed to produce, and thereby hold the lease,
even though unprofitable wells are also producing. 123 Said another
way, in South Louisiana terms, is not royalty on an unprofitable well
"lagniappe," on top of royalty on a profitable well? In what manner
is the lessor harmed by making a little bit more money, particularly
if the lease would unquestionably be maintained if the production
from the deficient well were disregarded?
Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins rejected a lessee's claim that its
well could "produce oil in paying quantities, if it is connected with
other wells having like production, to a central pumping power."'
124
The court observed that the "provision in this lease is that oil shall be
found in paying quantities on these premises, not on some other
premises, and therefore the economy in operation that may be
possible by pumping it in connection with wells on other premises is
not controlling in the determination of that question."'
' 25
If production is being obtained from one zone, is it necessary to
also obtain production from other zones in order to maintain the lease
in effect?
In Coyle v. North American Oil Consolidated, lessor sued the
lessee contending that the lease had lapsed as to a deeper zone or
120. Id
121. 912 F.2d 696, 705, 111 Oil & Gas Rep. 618 (4th Cir. 1990).
122. Id.
123. Williams & Meyers, supra note 92, § 6.04.6(g).
124. 278 F. 854, 858 (6th Cir. 1922).
125. Id.
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stratum which the lessee was not producing and which, therefore, the
lessor contended that the lease had been "abandoned" by the lessee. 126
The lessor argued that, "when there are two or more separate or
distinct strata of oil-bearing sands in lands, each should be considered
a separate and distinct oil field.' 27 The failure to produce or develop
one of the strata, lessor contended, manifests an abandonment by the
lessee. The court rejected this contention, saying:
Under the plain and unequivocal terms of the lease contracts,
the leases are to remain in full force and effect as long as oil
is produced. Oil is now being produced in paying quantities
under the leases from the Lower Marine stratum. There is no
language used in the lease contracts to indicate that it was
ever intended that different strata or levels were to be
considered separate oil fields. Undoubtedly these lease
contracts contemplate that they shall remain in force and
effect as long as oil is produced from the lands, irrespective
from what level or stratum it is found. 28
Where multiple wells are producing and the operator maintains its
accounting on a field basis, without distinction between wells, a court
found no manifest error on the part of a jury which rejected the
operator's testimony that the expenses should have been allocated on
an "income basis, that is, if one well produces five times as much
income as another it should be allocated five times as much
expense.'
129
In Arkansas, it has been held that a lease will be deemed to be
producing in "paying quantities" where it is in a unit which is
producing in "paying quantities," even if the lease itself, on a lease
basis, is unprofitable.' 3u "The focus must be on whether the well is
producing gas in paying quantities to the lessee, and that can only be
determined by examining production from the unit as a whole.""'
D. Market Conditions
The courts have indicated that the economic state of the energy
industry is relevant in a case wherein the lessor asserts that the lessee
has failed to produce his lease in "paying quantities." In a case not
126. 201 La. 99, 9 So. 2d 473 (1942).
127. Id. at 104, 9 So. 2d at 475.
128. Id. at 115,9 So. 2d at 479
129. Sullivan and Garnett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891, 893, 8 Oil & Gas Rep.
1141 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1957) (writ refused n.r.e.).
130. Perry v. Nicor Exploration, Inc., 738 S.W.2d 414, 97 Oil & Gas Rep. 494
(1987).
131. Id. at 416.
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designated for publication, the appellate court noted that the "trial
judge correctly pointed out that another valid factor to be considered
in determining whether there has been production in paying quantities
is the 'serious down flux of production during this period,' apparently
referring to the state of the economy in the oil and gas industry during
the period in which lessor claims there was failure to produce in
paying quantities."
' 31
Moreover, in Denkerv. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., the court
stated:
Ever since the commencement of his action the oil industry
has been and still is passing through a period of depression
and many oil producing operations, due to the low price of
crude oil, are being carried on at a loss, which under normal
conditions would result in profit. We are of the opinion that
the parties, when they used such phrase [viz., "production,"
construed herein as meaning "production in paying
quantities"], contemplated normal conditions and not the
unusual conditions to which we have referred, and intended
that the question of whether the requirements thereof were
being met should be determined in the light of such normal
conditions; and that if the wells would produce a profit over
operating expenses under normal conditions and the
Petroleum Corporation is willing to continue to operate them
at a loss believing in good faith that normal conditions will
return and the wells will ultimately produce a profit over
operating expenses, it cannot be said that the wells are not
producing oil in paying quantities within the meaning of the
lease.'33
In Barby v. Singer, the court stated, "[t]he failure of the lease to
produce a profit does not in and of itself terminate the lease.
Compelling equitable considerations may rescue the lease from
termination even when well operations are unprofitable."'3
E. Temporary Cessation of Production
The Texas Supreme Court has held that, even in a mineral lease
which is silent as to the lessee's obligation to continuously maintain
production or to restore production once it ceases, a "temporary
132. Blanchard v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Docket No. 89-CA-1283 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1991) (not designated for publication).
133. 56 F.2d 725,727 (10th Cir. 1932).
134. 648 P.2d 14, 73 Oil & Gas Rep. 344 (Okla. 1982) (upholding an otherwise
unprofitable lease because of then pending legislation [NGPA] which, if passed,
would result in increased gas prices).
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cessation" clause is "necessarily implied."' To prevent the
termination of the lease under an implied temporary cessation
clause, (i) the cessation of production in the words of the courts
must be "due to a sudden stoppage of the well or some mechanical
breakdown of the equipment used in connection therewith, or the
like," and (ii) the lessee must remedy the problem and resume
production within a "reasonable time." 36 The lessee has the burden
of proving that the cause of the cessation is of a type or nature
envisioned by the doctrine--"some mechanical breakdown.., or
the like." '137 The doctrine was applied to maintain a lease in Cobb
v. Natural Gas Pipeline Company ofAmerica. '38
In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Pool, the Texas
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision which had ruled
that the leases at issue had terminated under the "temporary
cessation of production" doctrine.'39 The majority of the court
chose not to reach the doctrine, basing its decision instead on its
determination that, even assuming that the leases had lapsed, the
lessees "thereafter acquired by adverse possession fee simple
determinable interests in the mineral estates that are identical to
those the lessees held under the leases."'' 40
Particularly comforting to the industry is the dissenting opinion,
which deemed the majority opinion inappropriate to not reach the
issue of lease termination under the "temporary cessation of
production" doctrine, a question "which is undoubtedly important to
the jurisprudence of the State."' 4 ' Defendants-appellants had argued
that the "temporary cessation of production" doctrine and the
production in "paying quantities" doctrine were harmonious. They
thought it made no sense to come to a different result where a lease
might produce a token volume (even 1 mcf) as opposed to being shut-
in for a full month, based on a lack of a viable market for the
production over a short period of time. Dissenting Justice Jefferson
examined in some detail the prior jurisprudence on the subject and
expressed the view that it was too limited or narrow to the extent that
135. Midwest Oil Corp. v. Winsauer, 323 S.W.2d 944,946, 10 Oil & Gas Rep.
1123 (Tex. 1959).
136. Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W.2d 783,784 (Tex. 1941).
137. Bradley v. Avery, 746 S.W.2d 341, 343, 102 Oil & Gas Rep. 577 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1988).
138. 897 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1990).
139. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. ofAmerica v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. 2003),
(reversing 30 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000) & 30 S.W.3d 639 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 2000)). Closely watched by the practicing oil and gas bar, Pool was
argued on March 6, 2002, and was under deliberation for seventeen and a half
months before the original decision was rendered.
140. Id. at 190.
141. Id. at 202 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
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it only allowed relief to the lessee when the temporary cessation is
caused by "some mechanical breakdown." Noting that the "TCOP
doctrine recognizes that lessors and lessees have a mutual interest in
maintaining a lease that produces in paying quantities," Justice
Jefferson stated that, if the issue were presented, he "would hold that
the TCOP doctrine should be equally applicable to market-induced
interruptions as it is to stoppages caused by mechanical or other
physical events."' 42 Going further, the dissenting justice indicated
that he "would reject the Watson v. Rochmill formulation to the extent
it forces the automatic termination of leases, in which profitable
production is not in dispute, when there is a temporary cessation of
production that furthers the economic interests of both lessors and
lessees."' 43 One thing that can certainly be said about this case is,
"stay tuned."
Does the doctrine of "temporary cessation of production" exist in
Louisiana law? No Louisiana case has addressed this issue in those
precise terms, perhaps because most-if not virtually all-mineral
leases contain an express clause addressing this issue." Because the
lease contains an express provision regulating the term of the lease,
the court would be without authority to imply a provision contrary to
the express clause.'45
The "resumption of operations or production" clause is in the
nature of an express resolutory condition. 146 In Talley v. Lawhon, the
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected a contention that the lessor must
put the lessee in default as a prerequisite to a termination, stating:
There was nothing the said company could have been put in
default about, as there was no obligation on its part to do
142. Id. at 206.
143. Id. at 209.
144. In George Hazlett, Effect of Temporary Cessation ofProduction on Leases
and Term Royalties, 10 Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 201, 248 (1959), the author
observed that the "cases above cited were decided on the basis of the habendum
clause alone, as with only rare exceptions the leases ... involved did not contain
qualifying provisions such as the 'cessation' clause."
145. See Louisiana Gas Lands, Inc. v. Burrow, 197 La. 275, 289, 1 So. 2d 518,
521 (1941) (implied obligation "cannot be invoked so as to erase entirely from the
contract those provisions which expressly declare that the lessee's rights shall
continue so long as gas is produced in paying quantities."). Cf Exxon Corp. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 678 S.W.2d 944, 947, 83 Oil & Gas Rep. 623 (Tex. 1984)
("All parties agreed upon the termination clause. These clauses expressly and
unambiguously set out the terms under which the contract could be terminated.
There can be no implied covenant to the contrary.").
146. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1767, 1768 (2004).
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anything. There was only a right on its part to prolong the
existence of the lease by doing a certain specified thing within
a certain specified time, or let the lease run out by not doing
that thing. 47
F. Relevance of Revenue and Expenses After Suit Is Filed
If a lessor files suit to seek the cancellation of a mineral lease
which the lessor alleges has terminated because of the lack of
production in "paying quantities," the lessee is generally not inclined
to expend financial resources to improve or enhance production in the
face of such a suit. A lessee would be imprudent to spend money
when the lessor has contended that the lease has lapsed under these
circumstances. This is particularly true in light of recent decisions
holding that a producer ceases to be in good faith after a suit is filed
and, consequently, that the operator is not entitled to recover its costs
and expenses from that date.'48
If, as a consequence of the lessee withholding expenditures,
production diminishes after suit is filed, can such post-petition
revenue be considered in applying the second prong of the test? In
Noel v. Amoco Production Co., it was said that a "lessor is estopped
from complaining about any alleged cessation of production in paying
quantities that is the result of the lessee's failure to maintain and
repair the wells during the pendency of the suit by the lessor.' ' 149 This
is consistent with the line of cases which excuses performance by the
lessee during the pendency of a suit to cancel the lease, provided that
the lessee prevails. 5 '
However, in Edmundson Brothers Partnership v. Montex Drilling
Co., the court distinguished Noel on the basis that, in Noel, "the well
147. 150 La. 25, 28-29, 90 So. 427, 428 (1922).
148. See Edmundson Bros. P'ship v. Montex Drilling Co., 98-1564 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1999), 731 So. 2d 1049, 142 Oil & Gas Rep. 266; Lamson Petroleum Corp.
v. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc., 2002-138 (La. App. 3d Cir.), 823 So. 2d 431, writ
granted, 2002-1338 (La.), 832 So. 2d 975, remanded to 2001-1201 (La. App. 3rd
Cir. 2002), 843 So. 2d 424, writ denied, 2003-0333 (La. 2003); 841 So. 2d 796.
The courts relied on Louisiana Civil Code article 487 ("For purposes of accession,
a possessor is in good faith when he possesses by virtue of an act translative of
ownership and does not know of any defects in his ownership. He ceases to be in
good faith when these defects are made known to him or an action is instituted
against him by the owner for the recovery of the thing.") (emphasis added).
149. 826 F. Supp. 1000, 1016 (W.D. La. 1993).
150. See, e.g., Fomby v. Columbia County Dev. Co., 155 La. 705,719, 99 So.
537, 542 (1924) ("By filing and prosecuting these suits, plaintiffs have made it
utterly impracticable for the assignees of the lessee to exercise the rights granted by
the leases. Having made it thus impracticable by their own acts, plaintiffs are not
in position to contend that the leases have expired.").
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was producing in paying quantities at the time suit was filed,"
whereas, in Edmundson, the plaintiff had "averred from the inception
of the suit that the ... lease was not producing in paying quantities.
There is nothing in the record which would tend to show that the
production from the lease has been affected in any way by the suit." 5'
On the basis of this finding, the court in Edmundson found that
"the receipts and expenses allocable to the lease since the suit was
filed are relevant to the issue of whether production has been
'sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent operator to continue
production in an effort to secure a return on his investment or to
minimize any loss."" 52
One might argue that this finding in Edmundson was dictum as
the court ordered the lease cancelled on a finding of lack of
development. In any event, it is submitted that it is unjust to
essentially penalize a lessee for failing to take those steps which it
might otherwise be willing to take but for the fact that its lessor is
suing it to cancel the lease. If the lessor prevails on the suit which it
brought on the basis of pre-suit facts, that is one thing, but, in the face
of the cancellation suit which the lessee is defending, it is a bit of
"having it both ways" to expect that the lessee will expend financial
resources when the lessor is contending that the lessee no longer has
a valid mineral lease. Post-suit production was allowed to be
considered in the Oklahoma case of Duerson v. Mills.'53
G. Necessity for Notice and Opportunity to Cure Default
Having examined the cases dealing with the subject of production
in "paying quantities," some consideration should be devoted to the
necessity of notice and the granting to the lessee of an additional time
to respond in some manner in those cases where the lessor claims that
production is not being secured in "paying quantities." In the rare
case that the mineral lease form under which the lessee operates
contains no requirement of notice, the question is dependent upon
general law. It is well settled that the habendum clause is a term
concept or a resolutory condition. '54 Furthermore, the Louisiana Civil
Code provides that the "lease ceases of course, at the expiration of the
time agreed on."' 55 With particular references to mineral leases, the
Mineral Code states that a "mineral lease terminates on the
151. Edmundson Bros., 731 So. 2d at 1057.
152. Id.
153. 648 P.2d 1276, 73 Oil & Gas Rep. 39 (Ok. Ct. App. 1982).
154. See La. Civ. Code art. 1767 (2004); Smith v. Sun Oil Co., Inc., 172 La.
655, 135 So. 15 (1931).
155. La. Civ. Code art. 2727.
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expiration of the agreed term or upon the occurrence of an express
resolutory condition."'' 5
6
In such instances, there is no necessity to put the lessee in
default. Putting them in default would be inconsistent with a
position that the lease had expired by its own terms, since a putting
in default would constitute an acknowledgment that the lease was
still viable.'57
Under the more prevalent lease forms in current use in
Louisiana, there are particular provisions which require that the
lessee be given notice of an alleged breach or non-compliance of the
lease, and permitting it a period of time to obviate such breach, or
to otherwise comply with the terms of the contract. For example,
the clause contained in one popular lease form reads:
In the event that Lessor at any time considers that operations
are not being conducted in compliance with the lease, Lessor
shall notify Lessee in writing of the facts relied upon as
constituting a breach hereof, and Lessee, if legally required
to conduct operations in order to maintain the lease in force,
shall have sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice in
which to commence the necessary operations to comply with
the requirements hereof.'58
There are numerous Louisiana cases which consider the question
as to whether the notice provision of mineral leases applies to
certain aspects of lease maintenance, as opposed to others. 5 9 In
Smith v. Sun Oil Co., Inc., the lessee argued that it was entitled to
an opportunity to cure the default, relying on the "judicial
ascertainment" clause. 6 ° The court held that such clause did not
apply to this case, "where the sole inquiry is whether or not the
156. La. Min. Code art. 133, La. R.S. 31:133 (2004).
157. See Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 1027, 42 So. 489, 493 (1906):
To put in default is to call upon the debtor to perform .... But where the
contract has been breached, and the resolutory condition thereby
accomplished, and the creditor does not desire the performance of the
contract, but the enforcement ofthe resolutory condition, he naturally does
not call upon the debtor to perform, but brings suit for the enforcement of
the resolutory condition.
158. Bath-Gram Form 42 CPM-New South Louisiana Revised Four (4)-Pooling
Revised "B" 11.
159. See, e.g., Bouterie v. Kleinpeter, 258 La. 605, 247 So. 2d 548, 39 Oil &
Gas Rep. 256 (1971).
160. 172 La. 655, 656, 135 So. 15, 16 (1931).
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lease has expired and terminated by its own terms; no more, in fact,
than if the lease had expired on a fixed date instead of an uncertain
date. , 1
6 1
The court in Vance v. Hurley indicated that the "judicial
ascertainment" clause would be operative in cases where it is asserted
by the lessor that production was not in "paying quantities.' 62 The
court had the following to say on the issue:
Furthermore, if the plaintiffs had entertained any doubt that
the lease was being properly operated and developed in
accordance with the contract and desired its cancellation for
this purpose, they overlooked the provision in the contract
that 'In the event lessor considers that operations are not
being conducted in compliance with this contract, lessee shall
be notified in writing of the facts relied upon as constituting
a breach hereof and lessee shall have sixty (60) days after
receipt of such notice to comply with the obligations imposed
by virtue of this instrument,' as the record shows they failed
to give such notice163
It must be stated, however, that the court engaged in this discussion
after having concluded that the production was in fact in "paying
quantities" for the reason that all possible development had been
pursued. Thus, the comments as to the absence of notice were not
necessary to the decision and were, it is submitted, obiter dictum.
That is, since the issue of notice was not essential to the
determination and was not, therefore, before the court, any expression
by the court on that issue was not necessary to its decision and thus
should be disregarded.
It was argued in the Bouterie case, at the court of appeal level,
that such language was dicta.'" In response to this argument,
however, the Bouterie court concluded that "an examination of that
case [Vance v. Hurley] does not lead this court to that conclusion. 165
Notwithstanding the notice language addressed in these cases, it
is submitted that the notice provision in a mineral lease would not be
applicable in those instances where a mineral lessor seeks to establish
that the production being secured under the lease is not commercial
161. Id. at 656-57, 135 So. at 16.
162. 215 La. 805, 41 So. 2d 724 (1949).
163. Id. at 814, 41 So. 2d at 727.
164. Bouterie v. Kleinpeter, 234 So. 2d 812 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
165. Id. at 818-19. See also Bollinger v. Republic Petroleum Corp., 194 So. 2d
139 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ denied, 250 La. 463, 196 So. 2d 276, 26 Oil &
Gas Rep. 21 (1967) (involving a lease clause requiring pre-suit notice if lessor
considers that the lessee "has failed to comply with one or more of its obligations
hereunder, either expressed or implied.") (emphasis added).
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production; or in other words, that it is not in "paying quantities."
Since production which is not in "paying quantities" is really no
production at all for lease maintenance purposes,'66 the resolutory
condition embodied in the habendum clause would become operative
when production ceases to be in "paying quantities" (assuming, of
course, that the lease is not being otherwise maintained). Notice is
immaterial inasmuch as the lease thereby expires ipso facto by its
own terms. Indeed, it was so held in Bouterie v. Kleinpeter.'67
H. Bankruptcy as Force Majeure
In Webb v. The Hardage Corp., the court rejected the argument
of a lessee who had filed for voluntary bankruptcy that such action
was "beyond the control of the lessee," as required by the force
majeure clause of its mineral lease. 68
In Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Mingo Oil Producers, the operator
of a mineral lease was placed into involuntary bankruptcy. 69 Seeking
to maintain a mineral lease which the operator had not actively
produced for some period of time, the lessee argued that the filing of
the bankruptcy proceeding constituted a force majeure which
"prevented the lessee or its assigns from producing or reworking any
wells."' 7° The court rejected this argument, saying that, "while the
bankruptcy proceedings were clearly outside the control of the lessee
or its assigns, the very premise of such proceedings are inherently the
result of financial problems.''
These cases are consistent with the well-established proposition
that the mere filing of bankruptcy does not, of itself, obviate the need
for the lessee to take those actions necessary to avoid the termination
of the lease. For example, it has been held that an "unless" form of
mineral lease terminated under Texas law where the debtor-lessee
failed to timely pay a delay rental, and that the lessee was not entitled
to a further period of time to pay the delay rental under section 108 of
the Bankruptcy Code. 172  "The simple answer to any apparent
166. See Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 142-43, 108 So. 314, 315
(1926) (quoted at supra note 13).
167. 258 La. 605, 247 So. 2d 548, 39 Oil & Gas Rep. 256 (1971).
168. 471 So. 2d 889, 893, 86 Oil & Gas Rep. 324 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
169. 628 F. Supp. 557, 91 Oil & Gas Rep. 417 (D. Wyo. 1986).
170. Id. at 560.
171. Id.
172. Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v. Benavides, 602 F.2d 998 (1st Cir. 1979).
An "unless" form of mineral lease takes its name from the provision which states
that it will expire at a stated time "unless" the lessee takes certain action to maintain
the lease, such as commencing operations or paying a delay rental. As so stated, the
clause is an express resolutory condition. La. Civ. Code arts. 1767 and 1768. See
also La. Min. Code art. 133. It is to be distinguished from an "or" form of mineral
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harshness of the result in this case is that a prudent man who plans to
file a Chapter XI petition tomorrow uses a cashier's check to make an
important payment today.',
173
L Production in "Paying Quantities " in Other Contexts
The issue of production in "paying quantities" may arise in
contexts other than the continuation of a mineral lease under a
habendum clause. A few of those other contexts are considered
herein.
1. Implied Covenants.
For purposes of the implied covenants to which a lessee is bound,
the elements of proof in a drainage case are, as follows:
In order for a landowner-lessor to recover damages from his
lessee because of a breach of the lessee's implied obligation
to exercise reasonable diligence in preventing drainage, we
think the lessor must allege and present facts which establish
that oil and gas could have been produced from the same
reservoir by offset wells drilled on the leased premises, and
that it would have been economically feasible for the lessee
to drill such offset wells. He must also allege and prove with
some degree of certainty the quantity of oil or gas which
would have been produced from the offset wells, and the
value of the minerals which the landowner would have
received from that production had the offset wells been timely
drilled and completed.' 74
In Breaux v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., it was intimated that the
drastic remedy of cancellation may not be available in such instance
if a second well could not produce oil in "paying quantities.' ' 75 For
purposes of this implied covenant, the requirement is that the well
must be sufficient to pay, in addition to lifting costs, the costs of
drilling the well. The reason for the difference is that, in the case of
a habendum clause, the drilling costs have already been incurred and,
provided that lifting costs are being met, the lessee is entitled to
continue to produce the well in order to recoup those sunk costs. In
lease, in which it is sated that the lessee should drill a well within a certain period
of time "or" pay a rental.
173. Id. at 1003.
174. Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406,415, 20 Oil &
Gas Rep. 476 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 La. 581, 165 So. 2d 481, 20 Oil
& Gas Rep. 501 (1964) (emphasis added).
175. 121 So. 2d 280, 13 Oil & Gas Rep. 750 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
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the case of a well not yet drilled, the analysis requires that the
expectation be that the drilling costs will be recouped, not just the
lifting costs.
2. Mineral Servitudes.
Another context in which the issue of production in "paying
quantities" arises, was previously discussed by the author in a
presentation on mineral servitudes, as follows:
In the context of interruption by use, the role of production in
"paying quantities" is two-fold. Under Article 29 of the
Mineral Code, one of the requirements for a use through
drilling operations is that there must be a "reasonable
expectation of discovering and producing minerals in paying
quantities at a particular point or depth." If a drilling
operation is commenced with such expectation (and if the
other requirements are met), the operation will serve to
interrupt prescription even if unsuccessful; a dry hole is
sufficient if it meets the "good faith" requirement. If
production is obtained (even if obtained as a result of an
operation not commenced with a "reasonable expectation of
discovering and producing minerals in paying quantities at a
particular point or depth"), such production
itself-independent of the drilling operation (which had no
bearing on prescription)-will interrupt prescription,
regardless of whether it is in "paying quantities," provided
that production actually commences prior to the prescriptive
date. "It is necessary only that minerals actually be produced
in good faith with the intent of saving or otherwise using them
for some beneficial purpose." [Article 38, Mineral Code.]
This codifies the jurisprudence which held that it "is
unimportant whether this production was in paying quantities
so long as there was some production or use of the servitude."
[Mays v. Hansbro, 222 La. 557, 64 So. 2d 232 (1953).]
Thus, for purposes of the interruption of prescription by
production, production in fact is the standard. Whether or not
production is in "paying quantities," production in fact will
interrupt prescription accruing against the mineral servitude
so long as the minerals are produced "in good faith with the
intent of saving or otherwise using them for some beneficial
purpose."
Production in "paying quantities" is defined in Article 124
of the Mineral Code. However, that definition is pertinent to
mineral leases. [The article appears in Chapter 7 of the
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Mineral Code entitled "The Mineral Lease," Part 4 of which
is entitled "The Obligations of the Lessee."] The essential
element of the codal definition is that production "is
considered to be in paying quantities when production
allocable to the total original right of the lessee to share in
production under the lease is sufficient to induce a reasonably
prudent operator to continue production in an effort to secure
a return on his investment or to minimize any loss." Thus, if
a mineral lease provides for a one-fifth (1/5) lessor's royalty,
"lifting costs" are measured against four-fifths (4/5) of total
production (even if the lessee's interest is burdened by an
overriding royalty interest which would further reduce the net
revenue interest attributable to the working interest). If no
mineral lease exists, and the mineral servitude owner operates
in its own right, it is entitled to five-fifths (5/5) of production,
a higher amount of production against which operating costs
are to be measured. Thus, assuming one could predict post-
drilling "lifting costs" with sufficient certainty, it is apparent
that more revenue accrues to the operator under the (unleased)
servitude than to the hypothetical mineral lessee, against
which the same amount of expenses are to be measured. In a
proper case (depending upon the amount of the royalty
reserved under a mineral lease), it might be that production
would be found to be in "paying quantities" for purposes of
the mineral servitude but not for purposes of a mineral lease.
Again, the production in "paying quantities" issue is only
relevant in determining if a dry hole was drilled "in good
faith." [If prescription is interrupted by production, it need
not be in paying quantities. Article 38, Mineral Code.]'76
3. Mineral Royalties
A mineral royalty is a mineral right which, as in the case of the
mineral servitude, is subject to a prescriptive period of ten years for
non-user. '77 However, unlike the mineral servitude, actual production
is required to interrupt prescription; a dry hole or good faith operations
which do not result in production will not suffice. 7 1
But, as with production from the mineral servitude, the production
necessary to interrupt prescription accruing against a mineral royalty
176. Patrick S. Ottinger, A Primer on the Mineral Servitude, 44th Annual
Institute on Mineral Law (1997) (citations in brackets).
177. La. Min. Code art. 85(1).
178. La. Min. Code art. 87.
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need not be in "paying quantities." Rather, "[t]o interrupt prescription
it is not necessary that minerals be produced in paying quantities but
only that they actually by [sic] produced and saved."' 7
In Lee v. Goodwin, a mineral royalty interest was created by deed
dated March 2, 1945.18 The royalty interest burdened a sixty-acre
tract of land. Although no well was drilled on the royalty tract, a well
was drilled on an adjacent tract and later unitized with the royalty
tract. The unit well was tested on July 14, 1952, and "it was
determined that the well was capable of producing. '  It was then
shut-in for a lack of market. Production did not begin until
November of 1955, or more than ten years after the royalty was
created.
The landowner contended that the mineral royalty interest
prescribed. Citing LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., Inc., the
court held that the royalty did not prescribe. In the course of its
discussion, the court made several references to the fact that the
production was in "paying quantities. ' 182 The court issued a
supplemental opinion stating that it did "not intend that the language
used in our original opinion relating to the facts of the instant case be
construed as holding that a royalty interest is dependent upon
production in paying quantities.""' The court declared:
The inherent nature of a royalty interest is that of a right to
share in any production, and it follows that production,
regardless of whether it be in paying quantities or not,
constitutes an interruption of prescription as against a royalty
interest.
We think it reasonable to conclude that the consistent
reference to a royalty right as a right to share in production,
which is so clearly indicated by the language noted in the
above opinions, excludes any requirement that the production
be established as profitable to the operator.'
179. La. Min. Code art. 88, La. R.S. 31:88 (2004).
180. 174 So. 2d 651,22 Oil & Gas Rep. 746 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 248
La. 149, 177 So. 2d 118, 22 Oil & Gas Rep. 753 (1965).
181. Id. at 652.
182. 230 La. 299, 88 So. 2d 377, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 443 (1956).
183. Lee v. Goodwin, 174 So. 2d 651, 655, 22 Oil & Gas Rep. 746 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1965).
184. Id. at 655 (citing Mays v. Hansbro, 222 La. 557, 64 So. 2d 232 (1953);
Union Sulphur Co., Inc. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632, 33 So. 2d 178 (1947); Union
Sulphur Co., Inc. v. Andrau, 217 La. 662, 47 So. 2d 38 (1950)).
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4. Shut-in Wells
The typical "shut-in clause" of a mineral lease allows the lessee
to maintain leasehold rights, in the absence of actual drilling or
production, by paying a "shut-in payment" if the lessee has completed
a well capable of producing gas in "paying quantities," but which is
not being produced for one of the reasons enumerated in the clause. '85
Because, by definition, such a well is not producing, the issue arises
as to how it is to be determined that the non-producing well is
nevertheless "capable of producing gas in 'paying quantities,"' such
condition being a necessary prerequisite to the right of the lessee to
maintain leasehold rights by the payment of "shut-in payments."
In Webb v. The Hardage Corp., the issue presented was whether
or not the lessee had timely demonstrated the existence of shut-in
conditions." 6 The court stated, as follows:
Reading LSA-R.S. 31:124 [which defines 'production in
paying quantities'] in conjunction with the terms of the leases,
the shutting-in of the gas wells on the three leased properties
could only extend the leases beyond their primary terms if the
wells were capable of producing in paying quantities.8 7
The court then noted that the lessor generally "has the burden of
proving the propriety of cancellation of a mineral lease," but held that
"the situation encountered in this case presents an exception to that
general rule."'8 8 The court further stated that:
A lessee cannot place the burden of proving the propriety of
cancellation on the lessor by simply alleging that a well that
has never been placed into actual production is capable of
producing in paying quantities. Rather, the lessee must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that prior to the expiration
of the primary term or the continuous drilling operations term
a well was completed and surface tested to the extent that the
well was at that time demonstratively capable of producing in
paying quantities.
185. Depending upon how characterized in the mineral lease, the "shut-in
payment" might be in the nature of a delay rental or royalty. Acquisitions, Inc. v.
Frontier Explorations, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1095, 78 Oil & Gas Rep. 282 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1983).
186. 471 So. 2d 889, 86 Oil & Gas Rep. 324 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
187. Id. at 892 (citing Taylor v. Kimbell, 219 La. 731, 54 So. 2d 1 (1951)).
188. Id. The court relied on Frazier v. Justiss Mears Oil Co., Inc., 391 So. 2d
485, 68 Oil & Gas Rep. 652 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), as support for the general
rule.
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Ordinarily, proof sufficient to carry this burden is a
finding of commercial productivity resulting from the
performing of the initial potential test required by the
Department of Conservation. . .. While other kinds of
evidence of production potential could also be considered,
such as the results of logs and cores, the flaring of the wells
for periods of time and the history of the wells in the same
zone in the field, the importance of actual testing of surface
production is obvious and is the most direct indication of
production capability.'89
The court then noted, by way of analogy, that the "importance of
surface testing is illustrated by the provisions of LSA-R.S. 31:34 and
31:90 which address the testing of shut-in wells in the context of
interrupting prescription on mineral servitudes and mineral royalties
respectively."' 90 The initial potential test, according to the court,
"must be conducted during the primary term or the continuous
operations term in order to continue a lease in effect beyond the
primary and the continuous operations terms."' 9' "Without such
surface testing, the status of the lease would ordinarily remain
uncertain while the well is shut-in." '192 "A lessee should not be able to
rely on the shut-in clause to hold a lease beyond its primary term
where the well's capacity to produce in paying quantities cannot be
determined until further testing and procedures are carried out at
some later date.' 93
VI. CONCLUSION
An inquiry into production in "paying quantities" involves a
comparison of revenue to expenses. Because the eligible revenue is
determinable solely on the face of the mineral lease, rarely does such
a case involve significant dispute over that side of the ledger. Rather,
the issue is most often determined by resolving disputes as to which
items of cost or expense are relevant.
Litigation on the issue of production in "paying quantities" brings
together a variety of disciplines-lawyers and landmen, petroleum
engineers and geologists, auditors and accountants. For the most part,
the courts have handled well the task of sorting through the
accounting and engineering issues so as to effectuate the expectation
of the parties to a mineral lease contract.
189. Id. (citations omitted).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 893.
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